Because of state-based regulation, single-state insurers are subject to oversight by a unique, domiciliary regulator (i.e., regulatory integration), whereas in the case of multi-state insurers, regulatory responsibilities are spread across several regulators (i.e., regulatory separation). In this study, the author draws upon recent theoretical literature pertaining to incentive problems and governmental organization to motivate an empirical study of the regulatory closure decision in insurance. Specifically, the author investigates whether there is evidence of the effect of regulatory separation and, if so, whether it appears to mitigate certain capture problems in the U.S. property-liability business. For a population of distressed companies, the author finds that the likelihood of solvency-related regulatory action is significantly-positively related to the number of states in which the insurer operates, whereas there is no evidence of a negative relation between closure and size. In contrast, for distressed single-state insurers the author finds evidence of a significant-inverse relation between closure and size. For companies subject to regulatory separation, as proxied by whether they write business in more than one state, these results do not support regulatory capture in the form of leniency towards larger distressed insurers (i.e., too-big-to-fail).
INTRODUCTION
Insurers say they favor state regulation not because they see it as less stringent but because it is best suited to evaluate the needs of local markets… . Missouri Insurance Commissioner Jay Angoff takes a different position. He says state regulation has survived because the great majority of insurers believe they wield significant influence over their home-state regulators. Adds Mr. Angoff, 'They'd rather be regulated by 50 monkeys than one big gorilla.' (Paltrow 1998, emphasis added) Michael Willenborg is assistant professor of accounting and Arthur Andersen Faculty Fellow at the University of Connecticut, Storrs, Conn. He thanks Michael Barth, Patricia Born, Joseph Fields, David Guenther, Jane Mutchler, Sundaresh Ramnath, Mark Roberts, Joseph Terza, Joseph Weber, workshop participants at the University of Connecticut, and especially two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions.
This article studies the decision by insurance regulators to take solvency-related action 1 against certain distressed companies but not others. Put another way, conditional upon evidence of financial distress, why are some troubled insurers the recipients of regulatory action, while some troubled insurers are not? One possible explanation for this observed variation in closure policy stems from the fact that the insurance industry is principally regulated by the individual states and, depending upon the scope of an insurer's operations, an insurer may be subject to oversight by either one or several regulators. A distressed insurer that operates in a single state is subject only to the oversight of its domiciliary regulator and may be able to exert significant influence over its home-state regulator. In contrast, a distressed insurer that operates in several states is subject to multiple oversight, and this situation may diminish its ability to influence its home-state regulator. To support the key ideas of this study, the author draws upon recent theoretical literature that models how, in the presence of informational asymmetries, capture considerations can influence the government's internal organization. In particular, the author applies Laffont and Martimont's (1999, p. 232) insight that separation of regulation (i.e., "splitting regulatory authorities among different regulatory bodies") can function as a device to thwart capture. In this sense, the insurance industry's state-based regulatory structure may help to "…regulate [the] regulators" and mitigate problems, such as capture in the form of leniency towards larger, distressed companies (Leland, Feldstein, Glauber, Mullins, and Wallman, 1997, p. 1190) .
It is important to note that the state-based system of regulating insurers has been under siege and that Congress has considered the prospect of federal regulation of the insurance industry. In April 1992, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce introduced The Federal Insurance Solvency Act, a bill proposing a federal role in the regulation of the industry. A subsequent report issued by this committee characterized insurance regulation as a supervisory Babel and repeated the call for federal regulation of the industry. This report offers scathing criticisms of state regulation and concludes that "most authorities are regulating solvency with a pronounced disregard for the known causes of insurer failures, as well as a blind eye to human behavior and experience ... [and that] the single, overriding weakness plaguing the supervision of domestic and foreign insurance companies is the widespread practice of wishful thinking by regulatory officials" (Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 1994, pp. vii and 6) .
In this article, the author refers to the New Regulatory Economics literature and its asymmetric-information based theories of regulatory capture, to develop an empirical study of the regulatory closure decision in the domestic property-liability insurance industry. The overlapping system of monitoring the financial condition of a multi-state insurer causes an informational division between the states, in the sense that a homestate regulator can no longer engage in unfettered negotiation with a given firm. As a result, the degree of discretion that a domiciliary regulator can exercise in the case of a distressed multi-state insurer is arguably less than the regulator can exercise in the case of a distressed single-state insurer. From a policy perspective, such an empirical investigation of the insurance regulatory closure decision could provide evidence to either buttress or refute the anecdotal evidence contained in Congressional reports.
Since, beginning with the early 1990s, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners' (NAIC's) Financial Analysts Working Group (FAWG) engenders information-sharing and cooperation for certain multi-state insurers, the author focuses on a window of time during the late 1980s (when the Insurance Regulatory Information System, or IRIS, ratios became publicly available) to examine whether the multistate structure of insurance regulation is associated with less leniency towards larger distressed insurers before the formation of FAWG. To mimic the institutional details of regulation, the author uses the IRIS ratios (supplemented with Best's ratings) to identify those insurers exhibiting a baseline level of distress two years before an instance of regulatory action against either this company or a similarly distressed, withinstate counterpart. For this population of distressed insurers, the author finds, ceteris paribus, that the likelihood of regulatory action is significantly-positively related to the number of states in which the distressed insurer operates. This finding provides evidence consistent with the idea that regulatory separation is associated with more frequent closure decisions. The author then partitions this population among those companies writing business in multiple states and those writing in a single state. For those distressed companies writing business in a single state (i.e., subject to regulatory integration), the author reports a significant-inverse relation between regulatory action and company size-a finding that appears systemic throughout the various states in the sample. In contrast, for those distressed companies writing business in multiple states (i.e., subject to regulatory separation), findings are inconsistent with capture in the form of leniency towards larger insurers. Overall, the results are consistent with the predictions of the New Regulatory Economics literature.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section provides background and motivation. The author then discusses data collection and a proxy for financial distress. Then the following section examines the data descriptively, estimates probit models of the decision to take regulatory action, and addresses concerns relating to the robustness of the results. The last section summarizes.
REGULATORY INTEGRATION VERSUS SEPARATION

Regulatory Capture and the Internal Organization of Government
Political scientists and economists have studied for a long time the separation of powers in government, an institutional structure thought to improve social welfare. The economics literature can be categorized into two groups: public choice/public interest economics and interest-group/capture economics. The public choice literature focuses on the design of institutions, by presumably benevolent regulators, to discourage rent-seeking behavior, thereby taking a supply side (i.e., political and regulatory institutions) emphasis (e.g., Landes and Posner, 1975; Mueller, 1981) . In contrast, the capture literature most often adopts a demand-side (i.e., interest group) perspective of rent seeking and is largely positive in its nature (e.g., Stigler, 1971 ).
Certain of this positive literature takes the separation of powers present in governmental institutions as a given and shows the benefits of such separation. For example, in a model of governmental corruption, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) show that separa-tion (i.e., in which different agencies "compete" in providing the same services) reduces corruption. In another contribution to this positive literature of government organization, Martimort (1996) provides a formal model of the costs and benefits associated with the exogenous separation of government. He applies a theory of multiprincipals to show how the sharing of regulatory responsibilities between multiple agencies can beneficially affect regulatory efficiency. He concludes that "… separation, by introducing informational gaps between rival agencies acts, indeed [works] as a commitment to reduce the risk of capture of the regulatory process. Separation is good since it reduces the regulators' discretion and the scope for their non-benevolent behavior" (p. 674).
An Agency-Theoretic View of Government-The New Regulatory Economics
Other economics literature on the internal organization of government and capture adopts more of a normative approach and models regulation as a control problem under incomplete information. This literature, the New Regulatory Economics, stresses the importance of informational asymmetries when examining how interest groups affect the design of regulatory policies. The New Regulatory Economics characterizes regulation as an agency problem with an informationally disadvantaged principal, a perspective that may provide insights into regulation. In a summary of this literature, Laffont (1994, p. 528) states that " [t] he new theory of regulation offers a framework to reconsider the question of capture by stressing the role of the regulatory agency as a collector of information for the State. Then the agency can favor an interest group by concealing information." Laffont and Tirole (1991) provide such an incentive-based theory of regulatory capture by explicitly considering the informational advantage that the regulated firm has over its regulators/principals. As a result of this focus on the regulator's informational disadvantage, they provide an explanation of why interest groups may have influence and why regulators may have discretion. Laffont and Tirole reformulate the regulation problem as an agency problem wherein the principal maximizes social welfare subject to additional constraints that originate from the agent's superior information. If the regulator is able to mitigate the informational asymmetry and learn the regulated firm's type, then the regulator is in a position to exercise discretion to favor the firm by concealing this information from the principal. Acknowledging this potential for capture thus adds a "collusion-proof" constraint to a rational principal's optimization problem and lowers social welfare. As noted by Laffont and Tirole, regulatory capture can manifest in many different ways, a common form of which may be regulatory leniency in exchange for "hoped-for future employment for commissioners and agency staff" (p. 1091).
2 In conclusion, they show that an increase in information asymmetry causes regulation to be inefficient and that such inefficiency leads to an increase in power on the part of the regulated interest groups.
Whereas Laffont and Tirole (1991) take as given the regulatory institutions and side contracting that regulators and firms can engage in, Laffont and Martimort (1999) go further and show how the choice of regulatory structure, in particular separation of regulators (i.e., dividing up the tasks of regulation among several, nonbenevolent regulators), can arise endogenously to thwart the potential for capture. Within the New Regulatory Economics literature's information/incentives view of regulation, they formalize the long-standing notion that separation of powers enhances social welfare. They show that regulatory separation creates incentive constraints that prevent the formation of coalitions and limits regulator discretion. These constraints lead regulators to "… remain relatively shy in their individual collusive offer when they fail to know what the other regulator has observed" (p. 234). Laffont and Martimort (1999) model a three-tiered (i.e., principal -regulator -firm) hierarchy, wherein the firm possesses private information about the efficiency parameter ( R ) of its cost function (C( R , q) = R q; where q is output). This efficiency parameter, R , is a random variable that updates twice (i.e., 1 2
R R R R
, and each time the regulator learns either nothing or that the firm is less than efficient (i.e., 1 R and 2 R are two binary random variables drawn from {0, % R }). The principal wishes to mitigate the information asymmetry about R and has a choice of using either a unique regulator (i.e., regulatory integration) or two regulators (i.e., regulatory separation) to collect information on the regulated firm's type. The principal will seek to maximize, subject to participation constraints for both the firm and regulator, a social welfare function consisting of consumer, producer, and regulator surpluses:
where É S q is the consumer's utility from production of , q M is the cost of public funds (i.e., a shadow, or marginal imputed, cost of using taxation to raise public funds), t is the transfer from the principal to the firm, s is the regulator's wage, U is the firm's utility (i.e., U = t -R q), and V is the regulator's utility (V = s). After substitution,
With regulatory integration, if the unique, nonbenevolent regulator learns that the regulated firm is inefficient (i.e., either that 1 R R % or that 1 2 R R R % ), he or she then colludes by offering a safe bribe to the regulated firm, where, in exchange for concealing the information that the firm is inefficient, the firm pays the regulator a minimal benefit amount that is less than the firm's full informational rent. Acknowledging this potential for collusion, the principal adds a collusion-proof premium to the regulator's wage to, in essence, pay the regulator so that the regulator will not extend the bribe. Although Laffont and Martimort model the bribe as a monetary amount, such bribes (as noted) often take other forms (e.g., future, private-sector jobs for lenient regulators).
In contrast, with regulatory separation, each regulator monitors only one signal and does not know what the other regulator has observed. 3 As such, the principal's collusion-proof constraint now depends on the bargaining between the firm and its two regulators. As a result, the premium to the regulator's wage to prevent collusion under regulatory separation is less than the premium under regulatory integration.
Regulation of the Property-Liability Insurance Industry
Because state regulation of entities with multi-state activities requires efficient interstate communication and coordination, the appropriateness of decentralizing the insurer oversight mission to the individual state level (in a separated regulatory scheme), in which financial resources and regulatory effectiveness can vary widely, is a contentious policy issue. 4 However, the alternative of federally regulating insurance companies (in an integrated regulatory scheme) does not necessarily imply an enhancement of taxpayer welfare. Property-liability insurers are domiciled in only one state but typically are licensed and write business in other jurisdictions. Although the current system of regulating the industry imposes primary solvency oversight on an insurer's domiciliary jurisdiction, the behavior of these home-state regulators is likely influenced by the concurrent behavior/surveillance of other state regulators.
5
When an insurance company does fail, similar to the demise of other regulated entities, it essentially is the recipient of a regulatory closure decision presumably representative of taxpayer interest. In the case of the insurance industry, each state has a guaranty fund mechanism to reimburse policyholder claims filed with an insolvent insurer. In all states except New York, these guaranty funds are financed by postinsolvency assessments levied upon the solvent insurers that continue to operate. Solvent insurers are then able to recoup their assessments paid via rates and premiums increases, policyholder surcharges, or premium tax offsets.
The industry's focus on solvency regulation has been previously studied by many researchers, including Munch and Smallwood (1980) , who find that minimum capital requirements help to deter insolvencies primarily by reducing the number of com-panies writing business in a given state. Relevant to this article, Munch and Smallwood also conduct an empirical study of the characteristics of insolvent insurers and report that the probability of insolvency is inverse with both the number of states wherein an insurer is licensed and net premiums written. Also relevant is a sequence of recent, large-sample empirical papers that contrast NAIC-based and other methods of solvency prediction/surveillance. These papers (Cummins, Harrington, and Klein, 1995; Grace, Harrington, and Klein, 1998; and Cummins, Grace, and Phillips, 1999) all document a strong, inverse statistical association between the likelihood of insolvency and insurer size. This study extends this literature by focusing solely on distressed insurers. In the context of these firms, the author expects that the likelihood of regulatory action should be positively associated with geographic dispersion and that the relation between regulatory action and insurer size should vary by regulatory structure (i.e., single-state versus multi-state, or integration versus separation).
It is likely that smaller insurers, which operate without the benefits of a large capital base, minimum scale efficiencies, or line-of-business diversification, are more susceptible to quick, catastrophic failure. However, another explanation for the prevalence of insolvency among smaller insurers could be related to regulatory structure and capture considerations. An implication of this explanation is that domiciliary regulators of single-state insurers may be less-inclined to pursue insolvency actions against distressed larger insurers.
6 This regulatory leniency is empirically studied by examining whether, after focusing on distressed companies (thereby excluding from analysis the cataclysmic failure of seemingly healthy insurers, in an attempt to control for the "market-driven" explanation for small-firm closures), smaller insurers are more likely to be the recipients of a solvency-related regulatory decision. Given existing literature and industry studies that identify insurer insolvency as a smallfirm phenomenon (see footnote 7), a naive expectation would be to predict that an inverse relation between insolvency and size would also exist in the insurance industry. However, the differences in regulatory structure in the insurance industry may differentially affect capture considerations and thus the presence of a too-big-to-fail effect.
7 Laffont and Martimort's (1999) model lends itself to empirical testing because
The most important and widely used criteria for security are size, rating and ownership. The strong relationship between large size and security is illustrated by the fact that the largest insurer in the United States to become insolvent in the past 50 years was the Mission Insurance Group (which wrote reinsurance as well as primary insurance), which at its peak was the 53rd largest property/casualty insurance group it provides a basis by which alternative forms of governmental institutions can be compared in terms of their ability to restrict regulatory capture.
DATA COLLECTION
Identification of Regulatory Closures and Proxies for Financial Distress
As an initial step, property-liability insurers against which solvency-related regulatory action is originally taken are identified. Because of the decentralization of insurance regulation to the state level, it is necessary to consult multiple sources to compile a comprehensive listing of regulatory closures. 8 An insurer is identified as the recipient of a closure decision if it was placed in conservatorship, liquidation, receivership, rehabilitation, or supervision; was suspended; was declared insolvent; or was ordered to cease operations during the period from January 1, 1989, to December 31, 1990. This procedure yields 70 companies (see Table 1 ) that, given the approximate 3,800 U.S. property-liability firms (Insurance Information Institute, 1988) , illustrates the uncommon nature of this type of regulatory action. The method of identifying regulatory action taken in this paper (i.e., in the form of conservatorships, liquidations, rehabilitations,...) neglects ongoing forms of tacit regulatory action such as merger shopping. In certain instances, state regulators may take action by attempting to locate a company willing to acquire a distressed insurer. If this merger shopping is more likely for a larger distressed insurer, then this paper would inaccurately identify this phenomenon as too-big-to-fail. However, a recent study by BarNiv and Hathorn (1997) suggests just the opposite, as they find distressed merged insurers are smaller than insolvent insurers.
Because the author wishes to investigate whether regulators exhibit forbearance towards larger distressed insurers or are influenced by the effects of regulatory separation, the next step is to identify that subset of closed insurers that exhibited financial distress before receiving a closure decision. For each of the 70 firms identified above, IRIS ratio results for the second previous year (e.g., 1987 IRIS ratios for insurers receiving a closure decision in 1989) are obtained from the NAIC. 9 This screen directs the analysis away from apparently healthy insurers who may have been victims of quick, cataclysmic failure and, in terms of testing forbearance in the form of a too-big-to-fail-type effect, should invoke a bias towards a null of no difference (see footnote 11). Changes. 9 The use of alternative proxies for financial distress such as insurer rating agencies would reduce the sample size of distressed companies. It is common for an insurance company on the brink of insolvency to stop applying for a rating from an organization such as A.M. Best. As a result, relevant information for many distressed insurers is unavailable from rating agency sources (see footnote 17). The author does, however, when available, use Best's ratings to eliminate likely false positives from the control group (see criteria #3 in the control group screen).
TABLE 1 Regulatory Actions
Property-liability insurers against which solvency-related regulatory action was initially taken in 1989 or 1990 and for which both certain NAIC IRIS information and a distressed within-state counterpart are available for the second prior year, listed by state of domicile. The IRIS was developed in the early 1970s to facilitate the solvency surveillance of insurers with multi-state activities. The IRIS for property-liability companies consists of 11 ratios computed using annual financial statements prepared in accordance with statutory accounting principles (SAP). The objective of SAP is to present an insurer's accounts on a liquidation basis, with a focus on monitoring insurer solvency, as opposed to other objectives such as the measurement of periodic income (Insurance Information Institute, 1987; Willenborg, 1994) . Insurers with four or more IRIS ratios outside of predetermined usual ranges are classified as priority targets for a second phase of financial statement review by examiners. The NAIC IRIS has been criticized for a univariate focus on a seemingly ad hoc set of financial statement measures and found to be statistically deficient in terms of its usefulness in classifying insurers. For example, in a study that contrasts neural networks with other methods of predicting insurer insolvency, Brockett, Cooper, Golden, and Pitaktong (1994) find that the NAIC IRIS correctly classify only 43 percent of insurers that became insolvent within two years.
Type of Regulatory
The author's decision to obtain ratios from the second prior year for this population of closed insurers reflects the reality that 1987 is the initial year for which the NAIC made the IRIS ratios available to the public, coupled with a desire for institutional saliency. 10 IRIS ratios for the second prior year are available for 51 of the 70 regulatory closures identified above. The IRIS ratios and their unusual ranges for propertyliability insurers are shown in Figure 1 .
Selection of Control Group
To pursue why these distressed firms in particular were the recipients of a regulatory closure decision, the author identifies companies that shared both the state of regulatory domicile and a baseline level of financial distress with the closed insurers. Examination of the IRIS results for these 51 closures (i.e., 70 insolvents minus the 19 firms for which IRIS information is unavailable) reveals that 26 companies, operating in a total of thirteen states, exhibited financial distress two years before their solvency-related regulatory decision by having four or more ratios outside the usual ranges established by the NAIC (see Table 1 for additional details).
11 Accordingly, it 10 The use of financial statement ratios for the year immediately preceding regulatory action may complicate the analysis by interjecting volatility. Per Veed (1996, 292), "[d] ata from the year before liquidation are unreliable, untimely, and skewed by the companies' struggles to rehabilitate themselves." In addition, similar to the problem of using alternative proxies for financial distress, obtaining IRIS ratios for the year immediately preceding regulatory action also reduces the sample size of distressed companies. 11 Although this data screen may at first seem extreme, the author imposes it in an attempt to mimic the institutional details of insurance regulation and identify those closed insurers that did in fact exhibit financial distress. The 25 insurers eliminated because of this data screen are both quite small, with average (median) net premiums written two years before closure of $7.5 million ($2.9 million), and relatively healthy, with an average number of unusual IRIS values of 1.72. The largest company among these 25 is Champion Insurance Company, a Louisiana-domiciled insurer placed in liquidation on June 5, 1989. In 1987 (i.e., two years before closure), Champion wrote $73.2 million of net premiums and had three unusual IRIS ratios. Champion was the subject of well-publicized fraud involving payoffs to state regulatory officials and subsequent incarceration of company management for failure to provide records requested by a court-appointed liquidator. Many of the remaining 24 insurers are extremely small (four of which were inactive, writing no business, at the time of regulatory action) or victims of catastrophic failure (e.g., the 1989 liquidation of the Grange Mutual Fire Insurance Company of South Carolina, with 1987 net premiums written of $0.8 million, was the direct result of claims incurred as a result of Hurricane Hugo). Exclusion of these 25 observations from the analysis that follows imparts a bias against finding an inverse relation between the likelihood of a solvency-related regulatory decision and size. See the section entitled "Empirical Analysis," in which the author examines whether results are robust to aspects of this data screen, in particular where the author brings the eight of these 25 insurers that had three unusual IRIS values into the analysis. 12 One distressed insurer, domiciled in Wyoming and acted against by regulators in 1990, had no similarly distressed counterpart that was domiciled in the same state, thereby reducing the population of insurers against which regulatory action was taken from 27 to 26. (1988, 1989) .
FIGURE 1 Insurance Regulatory Information System (IRIS) Ratios
IRIS
is for these 26 firms that a control population of 158 similarly distressed insurers operating in these states is identified. 12 These 158 companies also exhibited financial hardship during the second year before the regulatory closure of a companion insurer domiciled in the same state. An insurer is a control firm if it meets all of the following criteria:
1. Domiciled in the same state as an insurer against which solvency-related regulatory action is initially taken in either 1989 or 1990. 5. Has net premiums written greater than zero (i.e., to exclude dormant insurers).
By defining the control group in this manner, the author identifies insurers that also exhibited financial distress on two "radar screens" (i.e., the intersection of IRIS values and Best's ratings), but were not the recipients of a solvency-related regulatory action for a period at least one year beyond the time when a comparably distressed, within-state counterpart was closed. Econometrically, because this sampling scheme identifies a population, it does not violate the iid assumptions underlying probit (see next section and tables 3 and 4); as a matched-pair design (in which control firms are systematically selected from a larger population) would.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Descriptive Statistics and Preliminary Analysis
Of initial note is that the closed insurers (designated on Table 2 as Regulatory action taken or RAT) are outnumbered by the matched insurers (designated on Table 2 as Regulatory action not taken or RANT) by a factor of 1.0 to 6.1 (i.e., 26 to 158). In some states, such as Texas at 1.0 to 11.5, the ratio of distressed companies against which regulatory action is taken to their matched counterparts seems particularly low. In contrast to other distressed insurers in the same states, insurers against which regulatory action is taken appear to be both more financially distressed and larger. Overall, Regulatory action taken insurers failed an average of 5.77 IRIS ratios compared with 5.18 for the control companies, and the direction of this difference holds in ten of thirteen states. The average assets in the second year before closure for the closed companies is larger than that of the matched companies, $57.88 million compared with $42.00 million, respectively. However, within-state there is considerable variation; as, for nine of the thirteen states, distressed insurers against which regulatory action is taken are smaller, on average, than those distressed insurers against which 13 Screening on a minimum of four IRIS ratios creates the Primary Sample; please see the section entitled "Empirical Analysis," in which the author widens this screen to a minimum of three IRIS ratios. The author examines this Expanded Sample to investigate whether the results are robust to potential sample selection biases. 14 This ratings cutoff was chosen because the highest Best rating among those insurers receiving a closure decision (only seven of the 26 insurers against which regulatory action was taken were rated by Best two years before closure) was B.
TABLE 2 Descriptive Statistics-By State of Domicile
Property-liability insurers against which solvency-related regulatory action was taken in 1989 or 1990 and that had a minimum of four unusual IRIS ratio values in the second prior year contrasted with those insurers, within the same states, that also had a minimum of four unusual IRIS in these years (and a Best rating of B or less), but against which regulatory action was not taken from January 1987 to December 1990 (for insurers matched with 1989 actions) or from January 1987 to December 1991 (for insurers matched with 1990 actions). NPW, PHS, and DPW denote net premiums written, policyholders surplus, and direct premiums written, respectively. regulatory action was not taken. A contrast between these groups using a surplusbased size measure (policyholders' surplus or PHS) 15 reveals that, on average, the closed firms have greater surplus than the control group, $10.19 million compared $5.93 million, respectively. Again, however, there is within-state variation for this comparison; while overall the closed firms may appear to have more surplus, the direction of this difference holds for only six of thirteen states. To account for this, the multivariate analysis constrains these size effects within each state. Table 2 also reports descriptive statistics for the variable #States, representing the number of states in which a distressed insurer has direct premiums written (or, for reinsurers, the number of states in which they were licensed). The #States variable was obtained primarily from Best's Insurance Reports Property-Casualty and supplemented with the Insurance Almanac, the NAIC Contact Person Report, and the NAIC data tapes. On average, the 26 distressed RAT insurers wrote business in 14.19 states, compared with 4.44 states for their 158 similarly distressed counterparts. The author specifies this variable to identify insurers that write business in a single state (and are thus subject to an integrated regulatory regime in the sense that a unique regulator supervises them) and insurers that write business in multiple states (and are thus subject to a separated regulatory scheme in the sense that they are supervised by several regulators).
Regulatory action taken (RAT
Multivariate Analysis-Primary Sample
The preceding is descriptive and neither controls for incremental financial distress nor examines whether effects of regulatory separation and/or evidence of capture in the form of leniency towards larger insurers jointly exist. Table 3 presents the results of probit models that regress regulatory closure on a series of lagged, exogenous variables. 16 Because the design mimics the institutional details of insurance regulation, the econometrics are straightforward. The analysis is conducted on the population of insurers that presumably pass through to detailed regulatory analysis by virtue of failing at least four IRIS ratios (and having a Best rating of B or less) two years before any action and, as such, selection concerns are moot. The connection between an insurer manifesting distress and regulator action is Granger causal, and the assumption that firms do not self-select into manifesting distress seems reasonable.
It may be that solvency-related regulatory action is taken against companies exhibiting severe financial distress, above and beyond the four unusual IRIS ratios that elicit 15 The use of surplus-based measures of insurer size is commonplace, particularly by the various ratings organizations such as A.M. Best. However, the use of surplus-based size measure for a study of solvency-related regulatory decision making can lead to improper inferences. This is because it is often those firms with little surplus that are susceptible to failure and therefore whether PHS accurately measures firm size for a population of distressed insurers may be circular. The author also uses net premiums written, with no qualitative change in the results. 16 The author chooses probit for research design convenience. In addition to probit (or logit), the early warning literature provides applications of other methodologies, such as regression analysis, multiple discriminant analysis, hazard models, and neural networks (e.g., Harrington and Nelson, 1986; Ambrose and Seward, 1988; Kim, Anderson, Amburgey, and Hickman, 1995; and Brockett et al., 1994) , in the context of insurer insolvency prediction.
attention. Alternatively, insurers exhibiting such severe distress, analogous to Kane's (1990, p. 758 ) "zombie or near-zombie" savings and loans, may be the recipients of forbearance. To control for this, the author includes all 11 IRIS and the incremental number of unusual IRIS values as proxies for incremental financial distress. 17 The author also controls for insurer age, book-of-business mix, and whether the insurer is a mutual or a member of an underwriting group. Equation (1) regresses the occurrence of solvency-related regulatory action on these lagged control variables, the #States variable (proxy for regulatory separation), and the natural logarithm of total assets (proxy for capture in the form of too-big-to-fail): 
where: For all models shown on Table 3 , the individual IRIS ratios provide little explanatory power and, as such, are not reported. This lack of explanatory power is likely because all sample observations failed at least four IRIS ratios and, as such, any subsequent comparison of RAT and RANT firms likely has little remaining variation between these groups to exploit.
For Model (1) on Table 3 , which uses all 184 observations of the Primary Sample, the parameter estimates for the control variables, #IRIS failures -4 and Group, are positive and negative, respectively; consistent with the notion that regulators are more (less) apt to take action against insurers that are more distressed (members of underwriting groups). The #States variable is positive and highly significant; and provides evidence that the likelihood of solvency-related regulatory action is quite strongly associated with geographic dispersion. This suggests that the state-based system of Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. a,b,c Significant at or beyond the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively (two-sided tests).
, where L mle is the value of the likelihood function evaluated at the maximumlikelihood estimates and L constant is the maximum value of the likelihood function when all coefficients, except that of a constant term, are constrained to equal zero.
Probit regressions of the likelihood of solvency-related regulatory action on control variables and proxy variables for regulatory separation and regulatory capture. The dependent variable equals one regulating the industry may promote an externality compatible with regulatory separation, in that regulatory action (leniency) occurs more (less) frequently among those insurers for which regulatory authority is split among different regulatory bodies.
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The models (2) and (3) on Table 3 report the results of estimating equation (1) after partitioning the sample between those insurers for which the #States is greater than one (i.e., distressed insurers subject to regulatory separation) and those insurers for which the #States equals one (i.e., distressed insurers subject to regulatory integration). As noted above, and shown on Table 3 , while regulatory action was taken against 14.1 percent of the total sample (i.e., 26 of 184), the rate at which distressed, multistate insurers are the recipients of action is almost two-and-a-half times the rate for distressed, single-state companies (i.e., 22.7 percent compared with 9.3 percent). As shown in Model (2) on Table 3 , there is no evidence that incremental financial distress or group membership are associated with the likelihood of regulatory action for multi-state insurers. For these companies, closure is a positive function of whether the company is organized as a mutual. Interestingly, for these distressed, multi-state companies, the #States variable is not significant, indicating that the significant-positive if solvency-related regulatory action is initially taken in either 1989 or 1990 and zero otherwise. The population consists of 26 insurers acted against by regulators in 1989 or 1990 that manifested a baseline level of financial distress (i.e., they had both four or more unusual IRIS ratios and a Best rating of B or less) in the second prior year (i.e., 1987 for the 1989 closures and 1988 for the 1990 closures) and 158 insurers within the same states that also manifested the same baseline level of financial distress but did not receive a regulatory action during the period from January 1987 to December 1990 (for the firms matched with 1989 closures) or from January 1987 to December 1991 (for the firms matched with 1990 closures). Model (1) uses the full sample; Model (2) uses companies for which the #States variable is greater than one; models (3) and (4) use companies for which the #States variable equals one; models (5) and (6) The finding that the #States variable is positively correlated with closure contrasts with Munch and Smallwood (1980) , who study the determinants of insolvency for a sample of single and multi-state insurers from 1969 to 1976 matched, by state and year, with a random sample of control firms. In contrast to Munch and Smallwood, the author uses a sampling procedure that attempts to mimic the institutional details of insurance regulation. The author compares the recipients of a solvency-related closure decision with that control population of within-state insurers that also manifest a baseline level of financial distress sufficient to be identified in the initial IRIS screen. Among those multi-state firms that pass through to subsequent review by regulators, the author finds that the ones subsequently receiving a closure decision are writing business in more states, and this determinant of regulatory action is significantly-related with the observed decision to take regulatory action.
coefficient on #States in Model (1) is likely due to the simple distinction between singlestate versus multi-state insurers. In contrast, as shown in Model (3) on Table 3 , action against a distressed single-state insurer is positively associated with incremental distress and negatively related with size. 19 The results are consistent with the idea that, in a regulatory regime characterized by integration (i.e., oversight by a unique regulator), evidence of regulatory capture in the form of too-big-to-fail (i.e., leniency towards larger insurers) emerges.
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To pursue whether the finding that regulatory action is inverse with size for the single-state insurers is robust, the author runs the following regression that parses the size variable (i.e., LnAssets) into four size-slope indicator variables. Specifically, the author estimates Equation (2), which specifies a slope for each of the three states (within the single-state company subsample) with ample observations to drive parameter estimation (California, Pennsylvania, and Texas), and one size-slope variable for the remaining states. 
The results, reported in Model (4) of Table 3 , indicate that the presence of capture, in the form of too-big-to-fail, appears systemic throughout the sample of distressed singlestate insurers. All four slope coefficients are negative and are significant beyond the 5 percent level.
To pursue whether the decision to simply exclude the perfectly predicting Group variable (as discussed in footnote 19) affects coefficient estimates of the remaining variables, the author follows Lien and Rearden (1990) , who show that maximum likelihood estimates of the remaining coefficients in such a model can be obtained by eliminat- 19 For this subsample, Group membership is a perfectly predicting dummy variable. In other words, the author finds that solvency-related regulatory action is taken only against distressed single-state insurers that are not members of an underwriting group. Empirically, any dummy variable defines a dichotomous partition of a sample. If for all sample members on one side of that partition a success (or, in this case a failure) is observed for the dependent variable, probit estimates of the dummy's coefficient cannot be directly obtained by maximum likelihood methods. As such, because it is a control variable, Model (3) on Table  3 excludes Group. The author examines whether this exclusion affects the model (3) and (4) reported results; see discussion of models (5) and (6). 20 Because the 184 observations in the Table 3 regressions combine two years of regulatory action (122 of which relate to 1989 regulatory closures and 62 of which relate to 1990 regulatory closures) and, in a few cases, involve the same companies entering the sample twice, the author also estimates Equation (1) for each year separately. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported in Table 3 . 21 Because each regime acted against at least one insurer, the within-state coefficients are estimable by a logit or probit model (Oksanen, 1986, and Caudill, 1987) . However, the number of observations per state vary and the power of the test is more pronounced in certain regulatory regimes (e.g., California, Pennsylvania, and Texas).
ing all of the observations for which the perfectly predicting dummy variable equals either zero or one. Therefore, instead of the approach taken in models (3) and (4) on Table 3 where the regression is run on the full subsample of 118 single-state insurers without the Group variable, the author also ran the regression on the 81 observations (of the 118) for which the Group variable equals zero. Results of these regressions are reported as models (5) and (6) on Table 3 and provide results that are qualitatively similar to models (3) and (4) on Table 3 . Most notably, the inverse relation between solvency-related regulatory action and insurer size remains significant throughout the individual states examined.
Multivariate Analysis-Expanded Sample
The results reported in Table 3 are based on the sampling scheme discussed in the "Data Collection" section of the paper. This scheme may introduce selection biases that may cause the findings reported in Table 3 to be spurious. Specifically, the decision to impose data screen #2 which defined financial distress by having a minimum of four IRIS ratios outside the usual ranges, may be inappropriate 22 and unduly restrict the sample size. To examine whether imposition of this screen affects the results reported in Table 3 , the author reran the equation (1) and (2) regressions on an Expanded Sample that defines financial distress as having a minimum of three IRIS ratios outside the usual ranges and a Best rating of B or less. For purposes of the research design, it is important to condition the sample on those insurers manifesting financial distress (i.e., to proxy the notion of leniency towards larger, distressed insurers), though the results should not be sensitive to a specific, perhaps ad hoc, operationalization of this definition of financial distress. Table 4 reports the results of re-estimating the Table 3 regressions using this Expanded Sample and the results concerning the variables of interest (i.e., #States and the within-state LnAssets) are comparable with those reported on Table 3 .
Ex Post Assessment of Regulatory Action
As discussed in the "Data Collection" section, firms in the control group were not the recipients of a solvency-related regulatory action in either the same year or the next year as a within-state, similarly distressed company was acted upon. In other words, an attempt is made to identify distressed insurers that may have received forbearance. However, it may very well be that regulators were acting appropriately by not taking action; in this sense, what the author characterizes as "leniency" may in actuality be appropriate decision making. To investigate this possibility, the author follows each of the control, or RANT, firms through 1995 (i.e., the author follows the 1987 control firms for a total of eight years and the 1988 control firms for a total of seven years). 22 Per Klein (1995, p. 390, footnote 24) , "[a] popular myth, perpetuated in the academic literature and elsewhere, is that the 'failure' of four or more IRIS ratios targets companies for further regulatory scrutiny. In actuality, 15 screening criteria are used to select propertyliability insurers, … for further detailed analysis by the NAIC. These criteria are not made public but generally encompass factors such as an insurer's regulatory status in prior years, particular financial results, results for specific IRIS ratios, and other financial information. The detailed analysis then determines the insurers targeted for further regulatory attention." Of the 158 control firm observations in the Primary Sample (i.e., the RANT firms on tables 2 and 3), 25 (15.8 percent) were the recipients of regulatory action by the end of 1995. 23 Of these 25 RANT firms that were subsequently acted against, 17 operated within a single state. As such, 15.9 percent (i.e., 17 of 107) of single-state RANT firms received future regulatory action, which is substantially higher than the 9.3 percent rate of regulatory action taken shown in Table 3 . Certain of these 17 insurers were relatively large companies (e.g., Pacific States and Prestige Casualty) and may have benefited from leniency on the part of their domiciliary regulator. However, such a normative assessment of regulatory action is beyond the modest scope of this study, which is to investigate whether the variation in closure policy can be explained by appeal to the New Regulatory Economics literature. In other words, the author does not attempt to study or assess whether each regulatory decision to either take action, delay action, or not take action was appropriate.
SUMMARY
This article studies the decision by state regulators to take solvency-related action against certain distressed insurance companies, but not others, and specifically investigates whether there is evidence of the effects of regulatory separation and capture in the form of too-big-to-fail in the U.S. property-liability insurance industry. For the full sample, the findings demonstrate that the likelihood of regulatory action against those insurers that manifest a baseline level of financial distress is positively related to both incremental financial distress and the number of states in which the company writes business, yet is unrelated to size. When the sample is partitioned between single-state and multi-state insurers, evidence of an inverse relation between solvency-related regulatory action is initially taken in either 1989 or 1990 and zero otherwise. The population consists of 33 insurers acted against by regulators in 1989 or 1990 that manifested a baseline level of financial distress (i.e., they had both three or more unusual IRIS ratios and a Best rating of B or less) in the second prior year (i.e., 1987 for the 1989 closures and 1988 for the 1990 closures) and 225 insurers within the same states that also manifested the same baseline level of financial distress but did not receive a regulatory action during the period from January 1987 to December 1990 (for the firms matched with 1989 closures) or from January 1987 to December 1991 (for the firms matched with 1990 closures). Model (1) uses the full sample; Model (2) uses companies for which the #States variable is greater than one; models (3) and (4) use companies for which the #States variable equals one; models (5) and (6) also use single-state companies but exclude group members.
The variables are defined as follows:
IRISratio
= individual ratio value for all 11 property-liability IRIS #IRIS failures -3 = number of unusual IRIS values minus three LnAge = natural log of one plus insurer's age LongtailLOBs = net premiums written for worker's compensation, medical malpractice and other liability to total net premiums written Mutual = equal to one if a mutual insurer and zero otherwise Group = equal to one if insurer is a group member and zero otherwise #States = number of states where insurer has direct premiums written LnAssets = natural log of total assets State*LnAssets = insurer's state of domicile indicator variable times natural log of total assets regulatory closure and size emerges for the single-state companies but not for the multi-state companies (i.e., those subject to multi-jurisdictional oversight). These findings are consistent with the notion that the state-based system of regulating insurers manifests certain beneficial aspects of regulatory separation as theorized by the New Regulatory Economics literature.
The relationship between the incidence of solvency-related regulatory action and size, formalized in the banking industry as the too-big-to-fail doctrine, is a common problem that plagues the regulation of other financial institutions (e.g., for thrifts, see Kane, 1990 ; and for banks, see Mishkin, 1992) . The empirical findings do not support the presence of a too-big-to-fail problem among multi-state companies in the U.S. property-liability insurance industry, possibly due in part to the beneficial effects of regulatory separation. As a result, these findings may be viewed as complimentary of a state-based regulatory scheme. Characteristics of the overall regulatory structure may be of interest to participants in the debate on the need for a federal role in the oversight of the industry and for insurance regulators in general.
